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This paper is concerned with the problem of combining a non-linear income tax with an
indirect externality correcting tax. The analysis is performed in a model economy with two
types of individuals and two types of consumption goods. The government wants to
redistribute from the more able individuals to the less able, and also to correct for the
externality arising from the total consumption of the dirty good. It turns out that the optimal
tax structure depends on the complementarity or substitutability between the dirty good and
leisure. The second-best externality correcting tax can be interpreted as consisting of a
redistributive and an environmental component. Consequently, the dirt tax can be lower or
higher than the first-best Pigouvian tax.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory recognizes environmental problems as a misuse of environmental resources
due to ill-defined property rights. There is a Tragedy of the Commons, where the individual
optimal use of a common resource contradicts the social optimal use, and this causes
misallocation and externalities. Even though these problems can be taken care of by some
kind of social control (social norms), there are several reasons why social norms might not
work or why, if they work to begin with, they might be destroyed. Consequently, public or
governmental intervention might be necessary.
Public intervention might come through the market mechanism or via a package of regulatory
and/ or incentive instruments. However, as Bovenberg & Cnossen remark, each of these
intervention measures are imperfect instruments designed by imperfect people to be applied in
imperfect markets, the introduction of Pigouvian taxes, in order to internalize the
environmental damages, might be a solution to the problem.
In fact, many developed countries of today rely on environmentally motivated taxes, in order
to improve the quality of the environment and there has been an ongoing discussion of how
these environmental taxes affect the rest of the tax system. According to economic theory the
Pigouvian solution results in a first-best outcome, if there are no other distortions that affect
the allocation of resources in the economy. If the government is not able to set the rest of the
tax system in an optimal way, that is, no lump-sum taxes or transfers are available, then the
government faces a second-best world.
In the optimal tax literature, the second-best problem is seen as a problem of indirect control.
The government would like to control the individual consumption decisions, but lacks the
relevant information. Consequently, the government tries to control individuals indirectly by
using instruments that affect individual behavior. For example, in Stiglitz (1987) and
Edwards-Keen-Toumala (1994) the government is unable to observe and tax individual
ability, and therefore income is observed and taxed. The available tax instruments in these
models are a non-linear income tax and linear commodity taxes. With focus on the self-
selection (or incentive compatibility) conditions, Stiglitz determines the marginal income tax
rate to be zero on the top of the tax schedule and strictly positive at the bottom. Edwards et al.3
show that the introduction of commodity taxes into the model may slacken the self-selection
constraint and thereby change the result of zero marginal tax for the highest income in the
economy. However, they also show that defining effective or total marginal tax gives back the
results from the Stiglitz' analysis. Consequently, the zero on the top result depends on,
whether or not, both indirect and direct taxes are included in the definition of the marginal tax.
Since the pioneering work by Sandmo (1975), there have been many studies of optimal
environmental taxes in a second-best setting. The findings of Sandmo is that, the Pigouvian
taxation principle is valid in a general model of optimal indirect taxation and, that this is true
whether equity considerations are accounted for or not. Further, Sandmo concludes that the
optimal second-best tax on the externality generating good is a weighted average of a Ramsey
and a Pigouvian term.
In many of the later studies, within this field, the focus is on the so called double-dividend
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis environmental taxes will not only improve the
environment, but also make it possible to reduce other distortionary taxes, and thereby
improve the efficiency of the overall tax system. This issue has been surveyed by Goulder
(1995).
Two recent contributions on this subject is Bovenberg-de Mooij (1994) and Bovenberg-van
der Ploeg (1994). Among other things, they find that in a tax system with a linear labor tax
and an additional tax on the dirty good the second-best optimal tax on the dirty good has to be
below the first-best Pigouvian tax. Thereby, the dirt tax does not cover the total marginal
environmental damage.
The aim of this work is to se if an environmentally harmful consumption externality affects
the conventional results of the marginal income tax in the optimal tax literature and, whether
or not this is the case, if it makes any difference if the government have access to a
commodity tax besides the income tax. In other words, we try to combine the problem of
optimal non-linear income taxation with that of optimal corrective taxation. In order to do so,
we introduce an external consumption effect into the Stiglitz' model. From the Edwards et al.
study we know that the commodity tax has an important role in weakening the self-selection
constraint, but the question here is if it also plays any role in correcting for the externality. (I.4
e. does it matter if the government is correcting for the externality via income taxes or
commodity taxes?)
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, which combines the model in
the first sections of the Edwards et al. study with a consumption externality. In section 3 the
marginal income tax is analyzed, within the presence of the externality, and the results are
compared to the traditional results regarding the marginal income tax from the Stiglitz'
analysis. In section 4 the analysis from section 3 is extended by introducing a commodity tax.
The findings from this section are compared to the results from the Edwards et al. paper and
the results from the double-dividend literature, where conditions under which the dirt tax will
be different from the first-best Pigouvian tax are examined. Section 5 just briefly touches the
externality implications for the total or effective marginal tax rate defined in the Edwards et
al. study, and section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Model
The consumers
Consider a single period model for a closed economy. There are two types of individuals, N1
of type 1 and N2 of type 2. The individuals are identical in all respects, except that type 2 are
more productive than type 1. That is, type 2 have a higher pre-tax wage, w
2 > w
1. Each
individual spends L hours at work at the given wage rate, w
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There are two types of normal consumption goods, x and z. Good x is clean, i.e. the
consumption of good x causes no externality. The consumption of good z, called the dirty5
good, creates a negative externality, E. The externality depends on the total consumption of
the dirty good, which is a common assumption in the case of atmospheric externalities:
(3) E = N1 z
1 + N2 z
2
An individual of type h receives utility from the consumption of goods and disutility from





































For analytical convenience, it is assumed that E enters preferences in either a weakly, or in an
additively, separable way. Further, each individual considers himself being very small
compared to the economy and therefore ignores his own contribution to the externality, i.e.
¶ ¶ E z
h = 0. This assumption is in conformity with the usual competitive assumption.
Before proceeding with the individual optimization problem, it is convenient to rewrite the











We follow Christiansen (1983), and divide the consumer optimization problem into two
stages. At the first stage the disposable income is optimally allocated over the consumption
goods holding the labor supply constant. That is, (5) is maximized with respect to x and z
subject to the individual after-tax budgetconstraint:
(6) x
h + pz z
h = B
h where pz = 1 + tz6
pz is the consumer price, and tz denotes the tax on good z. The producer prices are normalized
to unity, a common arbitrary normalization in this kind of optimum tax models, whereby the
tax on good x is set equal to zero.











According to (7), demand is a function of the consumer prices, the wage rate and after-tax and
before-tax income, but, because of the separability assumption, demand is not affected by the
level of the externality. Consequently, there is no feedback effect caused by the externality.
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ x L x y w = ( )  is the marginal effect on the demand for good x of an increase in work
effort when after-tax income, B, is held constant. Later on, we will abstract from the pre-tax
wage and refer to this marginal effect as the substitution/ complementarity relationship
between leisure and the good in question.
















In what follows w
h is left out and V






At the second stage of the consumer's problem, hours at work (or pre-tax income since we










































h) is the marginal income tax rate. There is one further assumption to be made




















The production side of the economy is characterized by a linear production structure, i.e.
linear in labor supply, and labor supply is normalized so that the wage-rate becomes equal to
each person's productivity. Further, it is assumed that the externality has no influence on
production.
The government
The government wants to correct for the externality and to redistribute from the more able
individuals to the less able. However, the government cannot observe the individual
productivity (or equivalently wage). This informational limitation excludes lump sum taxes
conditioned on individual wage. Therefore, the government has to rely on what it can observe,
namely before-tax income, y.
                                                          
1 More correctly, the F.O.C becomes ( ) - = - G G 1 T' y y B ( ) , but in what follows, VGGy and VGGB will be
denoted Vy and VB.
2 A sufficient condition for (11) hold is that total consumption, B, is normal.8
Accordingly, the government's problem is to choose a tax structure, i.e. a non-linear income
tax (T(y)) and a commodity tax (tz), to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation. For this purpose
the government will select after-tax and before-tax income (B and y) and the consumer price
of good z (pz). The individuals will have to choose between the B and y packages offered by
the government. Since there are only two groups of individuals, it is enough to characterize
only two points on the tax schedule.
There is also need for a self-selection constraint, since the individuals with the higher wage
(type 2) might want to imitate the low ability individuals. The self-selection constraints imply
that each type prefers the {B, y} set meant for them, to that meant for the other type. However,
the only case considered here, is redistribution from the high ability group to the low ability
one, and therefore, only one self-selection constraint will be binding. Assumption (11) makes
sure that both self-selection constraints cannot bind at the same time.
Until now we have assumed that the externality enters preferences in a weakly separable way.
The individual optimizing problem will not be affected if we instead assume additive
separability, since demand is independent of the externality under either separability
assumption. This is not true for the government's problem, since there is a difference between
the two separability assumptions regarding the distributional implications of the externality. In
appendix A we present the governments problem when utility is weakly separable in the
externality, while the presentation here assumes additive separability. The reason for this is
that the presentation is less space consuming under the additive assumption. However, the
analysis of the marginal income tax, section 3, the commodity tax, section 4, and the effective
marginal tax, section 5, covers both approaches.
The formal description of the set of Pareto efficient allocations is characterized by the solution
to the government's optimizing problem:9
(12) Max V
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2) + tz(N1 z
1 + N2 z
2) ‡ R
The first constraint ensures that the high ability type 2 achieves a utility level of at least V
2.
The second constraint is the self-selection constraint, which requires that type 2 cannot obtain
a higher utility level by imitating the type 1 individuals (imitation is denoted by im). The last
constraint is the government's budget constraint, where R is the exogenously determined
revenue requirement. The Lagrange multipliers that correspond to the restrictions (12) - (14)
are: d, l and m. Except for l, these Lagrange multipliers are always assumed to be strictly
positive, since we only study solutions where the constraints are strictly binding.
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(See also appendix A.)
3. Properties of the Income Tax
As already mentioned, the conventional results in this kind of analysis, Stiglitz (1987), is that
the marginal income tax rate on the high ability individual is zero and that for the low ability
type is positive. Edwards et al. show that the introduction of commodity taxes changes the
result of zero marginal income tax on the top in a formal sense. Their conclusions is that
commodity taxes should be used only if they discourage mimicking and that the total marginal
tax paid should be set to zero on the top, and strictly positive at the bottom
3.
One of the purposes of this paper is to see if and how the introduction of a consumption
externality changes the conventional results regarding the marginal income tax rate. The
analyses are performed under various separability assumptions considering the individual
preferences over the externality.
No commodity tax, utility is additively separable in the externality
The first order conditions (16) - (20) above, incorporate the consumption externality, a
binding self-selection constraint and a commodity tax on the dirty good. To begin with we
assume that the government does not have access to the commodity tax. That is, we make no
use of equation (20) and in the remaining equations, tz is set equal to zero. This makes it
possible to see how the consumption externality affects the marginal income tax.
                                                          
3 Total marginal tax, or effective marginal tax, is defined in section 5.11
Recalling from equation (10) that T y V V y B '( ) = + 1 , i.e. the marginal tax rate is one plus the
MRS between labor and income, or the total consumption expenditure. Consequently, it is
sufficient to analyze this MRS, for each individual type, in order to determine the marginal
income tax and the effect upon it due to the consumption externality.










































































Both equation (21) and (22) indicate that the marginal income tax rate depends on the income
effect, the substitution effect between leisure and the dirty good and the externality,
represented by the term ( ) V V E E + d . VE is negative and denotes the individual marginal
disutility from the externality, which is the same for all individuals when utility is additively
separable in the externality, whereby we can exclude the superscripts. The value of d reflects
how the optimal value of V
 1 must change when V
2  changes and can be interpreted as the
relative social welfare weight given to the second type. Accordingly, the term ( ) V V E E + d
characterizes the weighted marginal social damage, MSD, due to the externality, which of
course is negative.
Because of the assumption of increasing marginal disutility in the externality, the individual
marginal disutility and thereby the MSD will be greater if the demand of the dirty good
somehow increases in the economy. Since the individuals consumption of z are perfect
substitutes as far as the externality is concerned, it is important to analyze what will influence12
the demand of z in order to se the magnitude of a change in the externality. However, this is
an empirical question which is not possible to answer in this theoretical framework.
Consequently, presumptions about the sign of the income effect and the substitution effect
between leisure and the dirty good is necessary in order to perform the analysis here.
The most essential assumption is that z is a non-inferior good, i.e. the income effect on the
demand of z is non-negative, ¶ ¶ z B ‡ 0. This is a very convenient assumption to do, since
both the clean and the dirty good cannot be inferior at the same time according to our model.
Further, we assume that z and leisure are, either some kind of substitutes, ¶ ¶ z y > 0(i.e. labor
is complement to z), or complements, ¶ ¶ z y < 0.
With these assumptions in our mind, equation (21) tells us that the marginal income tax rate
for the high ability individual is positive, whenever leisure and the dirty good are substitutes.
I. e. the numerator in (21) will be strictly greater than minus one, while the denominator will
be greater than one. This means that, as long as more work gives rise to a greater consumption
of the externality producing good, the marginal income tax rate for the high ability type is not
only different from the tax when no externality is present in the model, it is also greater.
If, on the contrary, leisure and the externality creating good are complements, the marginal
income tax rate at the top can be negative, zero or positive depending on which of the income
and substitution effects who are greatest in absolute magnitude. This result is shown in table
1.a).13
Table 1.a): The Marginal income tax rate for the high ability individual when leisure and the
dirty good are complements, i. e. ¶ ¶ z y



















































2 = ￿ numerator = denominator ￿ = T y '( )
2 0
In order to determine the marginal income tax rate for the low ability person we need to

































From inequality (23) we se that the marginal tax rate for the low ability individual is positive,
as for the no externality case, as long as leisure is a substitute for the dirty good. The result is
in line with that for the high ability individual, since the externality introduces a Pigouvian
term into the tax for both ability types. It is therefore to be expected, that the sign of the tax
changes in the same direction as for the high ability individual, when we reverse the case, by
letting the dirty good become a complement for leisure. This is also shown in table 1.b).14
Table 1.b): The Marginal income tax rate for the low ability individual when leisure and the
dirty good are complements, i. e. ¶ ¶ z y
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So far we have concluded that the presence of a consumption externality clearly influences the
marginal income tax rate for both types of individuals. In addition, the externality (or more
correctly, the MSD due to the externality) affects the two tax rates in the same direction, via
the substitution/ complementarity effect between leisure and the dirty good. Since these
effects are off the opposite sign, the effect on the marginal income tax depends on which case
we assume.
When the dirty good is a substitute for leisure, both individual types have to pay a positive
income tax at the margin. The income tax has some of the properties of a Pigouvian tax, and
from an environmental point of view mimicking is good, since, in this case, type 2 consumes
more of the dirty good than the mimicker. Consequently, the government is taxing the high
ability type at a positive rate, at the margin, in order to depress the consumption of the dirty
good and thereby protect the environment. With a complementary relationship between the
dirty good and leisure, type 1 is the larger consumer of the good in question and the size of the
marginal income tax depends on the size of the substitution effect relative to the income
effect. This implies, that there are cases when the tax at the margin, from an environmental
point of view, should be negative for the high ability individual. Technically this occurs when15
the dirty good becomes a very strong complement for leisure, i.e.  ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ z y z B >  (see table
1.a)).
From table 1.a) and table 1.b), it is also evident that the marginal income tax is positive and
greater for the high ability type, compared to the no externality case, and positive for the low
ability one, when the consumption effect on the dirty good due to more work is small in
absolute value compared to the income effect.
It is evident from this section that the marginal income tax has not only a redistributive
purpose in the presence of a consumption externality, it has also a corrective aim.
Utility is weakly separable in the externality
When utility is weakly separable in the externality the analysis of the marginal income tax
becomes a bit more complicated. (Appendix A gives a formal description of the government's
problem under the weak separability assumption.) The MRS between labor and total
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As for the "additive case", equation (24) and (25) indicate that the marginal tax rate depends
on the assumptions about the income effect of the dirty good and the substitutability/
complementability between the dirty good and leisure. The difference compared to the
preceding section is captured in the expression:16
(26) [ ( ) ( )] l d V V V V E
im
E E E - - +
2 1 2
Expression (26) consists of two parts, and both originate from the introduction of the
externality into the model. The second part is the, already familiar, MSD due to the
externality, with the exception that the individuals marginal disutilities no longer are equal.
This inequality between the individuals experience of the externality and the first part of (26)
arises from the changed separability assumption.
The first part in expression (26), l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 , indicates that there is a difference in how the
mimicking type 2 and the actual type 2 experience the externality, and that this difference
should be reflected in the marginal tax rate. To be able to determine the sign of the tax, we
therefore need to know the sign of expression (26) and of the l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term. That is, we
need to know the size of VE
im relative VE
2. However, it is not possible to determine what
would make the mimicker and the actual type 2 to experience different marginal disutilities
due to the externality, since this is an empirical question.
Nevertheless, if the high ability individual suffers from less marginal disutility, due to the
externality, when imitating the low ability individual compared to when imitation does not
occur, then V V E
im
E >
2 and the l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term and expression (26) becomes positive. If, on




2, the l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term becomes negative. In this latter case, we need to know if the
l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term exceeds or is less than the MSD-term, in order to establish the sign of (26)
and thereby the sign of the marginal income tax.
Table 2a) and 2b) present the sign of the marginal income tax for the high ability person under
the two assumptions about expression (26). In table 2a) leisure and the dirty good are
substitutes, while in table 2b) they are complements.17
Table 2a): The Marginal income tax for the high ability individuals when z and leisure are
substitutes, i. e. ¶ ¶ z y
2 2 0 > .
[ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
im
E E E - - + >
2 1 2 0 [ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
im
E E E - - + <
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Table 2b): The Marginal income tax for the high ability individuals when z and leisure are
complements, i. e. ¶ ¶ z y
2 2 0 < .
[ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
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E E E - - + >
2 1 2 0 [ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
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By transforming equation (24) into inequality (27), see Appendix B, we can derive the
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The results of this exercise are given in table 2c) and 2d). Table 2c) assumes that leisure is a
substitute for the dirty good and table 2d) assumes the opposite case.
Table 2.c): The Marginal income tax rate for the low ability individual when z and leisure are
substitutes, i. e. ¶ ¶ z y
1 1 0 > .
[ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
im
E E E - - + >
2 1 2 0 [ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
im
E E E - - + <
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1 0 >
<19
Table 2.d): The Marginal income tax rate for the low ability individual when z and leisure are
complements, i. e. ¶ ¶ z y
1 1 0 < .
[ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
im
E E E - - + >
2 1 2 0 [ ] l d ( ) ( ) V V V V E
im
E E E - - + <
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It is evident from table 2a) and 2c) that the marginal income tax will be positive for both
individual types, if leisure and the dirty good are substitutes and if the mimicking type 2




term amplifies the MSD-term in this case, the marginal tax will be greater, for both types, than
under the additive separability assumption. However, if the mimicker suffers from more
disutility due to the externality than the actual type 2, the tax will be lower than in the
"additive case", since the l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term abates the MSD-term under these circumstances.
Nevertheless, as long as the l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term does not exceed the MSD-term in absolute
value, expression (26) and thereby the marginal income tax will be positive. The reason for
this is, as for the case where utility is additively separable in the externality, that the
introduction of a good whose consumption is a complement for labor and also produces an
externality, forces the government to raise the marginal tax, compared to the no externality
case, in order to internalize the environmental damage. If the government only taxed the high
ability individual at a higher rate, mimicking would be encouraged. Consequently, the
government taxes both types at a higher rate in order to accomplish the wanted redistribution
and to correct for the externality.20
Moreover, if the l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term exceeds the MSD-term in absolute value, expression (26)
becomes negative and so does the marginal income tax for the high ability type, while the tax
for the low ability one becomes indeterminable.
When the dirty good and leisure are complements, see table 2b) and 2d), imitation implies a
greater consumption of z. If the mimicker then suffers less from environmental damage than
the actual type 2, the marginal tax becomes negative for the high ability type and
indeterminable for the low ability individual, if the income effect is sufficiently small.
Otherwise the tax will be positive for both types. However, if expression (26) becomes
negative, the mimicker suffers more from environmental damage than the actual type 2, and
the marginal tax becomes positive for both types, if the income effect is small enough. An
income effect that exceeds the effect due to the complementary relationship between leisure
and z, makes the tax negative for the high ability type and indeterminable for the low ability
one.
Accordingly, when utility is weakly separable in the externality the two purposes of the
marginal income tax and the difficulty in separating them, become more evident. This is
because the externality, in itself, introduces distributional implications into the marginal tax in
addition to the distributional intent the government might have.
No binding self-selection constraint
If none of the self-selection constraints binds, the marginal income tax becomes zero for both
individual types in the Stiglitz' model. The reason for this is that there is no longer any need
for the government to distort the individuals decisions when constructing the optimal tax
schedule.
When there is an externality present in the model this result no longer holds since the tax also
needs to reflect the MSD descending from the externality. However, the interesting thing to
note here is that the two separability assumptions regarding the individual utility functions
lead to almost the same expressions of the marginal tax. This follows from the fact that, when
imitation does not occur expression (26) reduces to the MSD-term. Although, there is a21
difference in the MSD-term under the two separability cases. Weak separability indicates that
the individual marginal disutilities can be different, which implies that the distributional
implications of the externality remain.
Anyhow, in what follows, no binding self-selection constraint means that we only perform the
analysis under the weak separability assumption. The MRS for the two types when the self-


































The h superscripts indicate that the tax expression, although similar for the two types, is
evaluated at different points. Since the l( ) V V E
im
E -
2 -term has disappeared and the MSD term
is clearly negative, it is possible to determine the sign of the tax for both individual types
unambiguously.
Both types will face a positive tax if leisure and the dirty good are substitutes, and if leisure
and the dirty good are complements and the substitution effect is less than the income effect in
absolute value. Further the tax, for both types, becomes negative or zero if the substitution
effect is greater than or equal to the income effect in absolute value, when there is a
complementary relationship between leisure and the dirty good.
One interesting fact that has not yet been mentioned is that it is possible to interpret the MSD
in terms of the externality impact on the low ability person. Then, VE
1 indicates the direct
utility effect, while dVE
2 is the indirect effect, or the cost of giving person 2 a certain utility
level, since d reflects how VE
1 must change when V
2 changes.
Income tax and commodity tax22
Even though results regarding the commodity tax will not be presented until section 4, it can
be valuable to inquire if and how the commodity tax affects the marginal income tax already
in this section.
When the self-selection constraint does not bind, the commodity tax will mirror the MSD due
to the externality and the marginal income tax no longer needs to reflect, nor be affected by,
the externality. Consequently, the marginal income tax becomes zero for both individual
types.
If, on the other side, the self-selection constraint is binding, and utility is weakly separable in
the externality, the MRS for the high ability type, in the presence of a commodity tax
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By substituting the formula for the commodity tax (equation (40) in chapter 4) into equation































                                                          
4 The results concerning the marginal income tax, in the presence of a commodity tax, are the same whether weak
or additive separability regarding the externality is assumed.23
In section 4 we determine the sign of tz
s to depend upon the sign of the substitutability/
complementarity relationship between the dirty good and leisure. It is shown that if the dirty
good is a substitute for leisure, then tz
s < 0, and if the dirty good and leisure are complements,
tz
s > 0. Consequently, as long as leisure and the dirty good are substitutes the marginal income
tax for the high ability individual will be positive. This will also be the case when leisure and
the dirty good are complements, as long as the income effect is sufficiently small.
By performing a Stiglitz' transformation on equation (30), see appendix B, and substituting for































From inequality (32) it is evident that the results regarding the marginal income tax for the
low ability individual are in accordance with those for the high ability person. I. e. the
marginal income tax becomes positive for both the high and low ability types as long as
leisure and the dirty good are substitutes. This result also holds when more work reduces the
consumption of the dirty good, if the income effect is sufficiently small. However, with a
large enough income effect the tax becomes negative for the high ability type and
indeterminable for the low ability one.
It is clear from this section that the introduction of a commodity tax on the dirty good removes
the Pigouvian properties, as well as the redistributional implications due to the externality,
from the income to the commodity tax.
4. The Commodity Tax/ Externality Tax
We have seen above that the externality clearly affects the marginal income tax when the
government does not have access to a commodity tax. In Edwards et al. the commodity tax24
plays an important role in weakening the self-selection constraint. This is by taxing goods that
the mimicking type 2 consumes more of and subsidizing goods where type 1 is the major
consumer. When there is no binding self-selection constraint in the Edwards et al. paper, there
is also no need for a commodity tax. What is the role of the commodity tax in the presence of
an externality? We are here going to study three cases, namely when the self-selection
constraint does not bind, when the self-selection constraint binds and utility is additively
separable in the externality and a binding self-selection constraint with weak separability in
the externality.
No binding self-selection constraint
In order to analyze the effects of the commodity tax on the dirty good, we need to make use of
equation (A.9), in appendix A. Since we begin the analysis without the self-selection
constraint, l becomes zero in the first order conditions, (A.5) - (A.9), in appendix A.
By combining Roy's identity with equation (A.9), when l = 0, we get:
(33) - - + V z V z B
1 1
B

















































Further, if we substitute equation (A.5) and (A.7) into equation (33), then, after some
manipulation the result becomes:





























































Using the Slutsky relation, ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ z p z p z p z z u z z = + ,
5 in equation (34) brings us to the
below expression of the commodity tax:





What is the interpretation of equation (35)? 1 m d ( ) V V E E
1 2 +  is the MSD due to the externality
and always negative. Consequently, when the self-selection constraint does not bind, the
commodity tax is always positive. In addition, the tax reflects the whole MSD and therefore it
is a Pigouvian tax and we rename it to tz
p.
Binding self-selection constraint, utility is additively separable in externality
As already mentioned, it is not necessary to perform the analysis under the additive
separability assumption when the self-selection constraint does not bind, since nothing but the
superscripts changes
6. But with a binding self-selection constraint, it is valuable to separate
the two cases of separability.





























































From (36) it is clear that a binding self-selection constraint has an important influence on the
tax. As before ( ) V V E E + d  is the MSD of the externality and negative. Since the






u  is the substitution effect of a change in pz, and hence always negative.
6 Remember that these superscripts indicate that there is a difference in the two separability assumptions when it
comes to the government's optimal policy, but that the empirical implications concerning the individual demands
are the same.26
compensated demands also are negative, the size of the tax will depend on the sign of the term
(z
1- z
im). This term reflects the substitutability/ complementability between good z and leisure.
If z and leisure are complements, (z
1- z
im) < 0, and the term (z
1- z
im) has a positive impact on tz.
On the other side, if z and leisure are some kind of substitutes, (z
1- z
im) > 0, then the term
(z
1- z
im) tends to reduce tz. This brings about that a binding self-selection constraint will
introduce a redistributive term (or some kind of Ramsey term) into the commodity tax on z.
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It is evident from equation (38) that the commodity tax can be partitioned into two terms. The
first term, tz
s, reflects the effect upon the self-selection constraint and the second one, tz
p, is the
Pigouvian tax. This additive property of the commodity tax was first derived by Sandmo in his
(1975) paper. However, as Sandmo pointed out, the additive property of the tax does not mean
that the two terms can be set independently of each other.
When z and leisure are complements, the mimicking type 2 consumes relatively more of z
than type one. Consequently, the government would like to prevent the high ability type from
mimicking by letting tz
s > 0. In this case the distributional purpose amplifies the corrective
purpose of the tax and the resulting total tax on z, tz
*, becomes strictly positive and greater
than the first-best Pigouvian tax.
If leisure is a substitute for the dirty good, the low ability person consumes relatively more of
the dirty good than the mimicking type 2. This enables the government to achieve more
redistribution towards the low ability type by introducing a subsidy on the dirty good, i.e.
tz
s < 0. However, since the government also wants to correct for the externality by setting27
tz
p > 0 the total tax on z can be positive, zero or negative. Consequently, the two purposes of
the tax compete with each other and the only thing we can conclude from this is that the
commodity tax on z must be greater than if no externality existed.
According to the "double dividend literature", the tax rate for polluting goods should lie above
the Pigouvian tax in models with only indirect taxes. Although, if it exists linear labor taxes
and the tax on the clean consumption good is normalized to zero, the dirt tax should lie below
the Pigouvian tax. This later view is presented in Bovenberg-de Mooij (1994) and Bovenberg-
van der Ploeg (1994).
7
In our model, the above analysis concludes that, the commodity tax on the dirty good will be
higher than the Pigouvian tax, whenever leisure and the dirty good are complements, and
lower than the Pigouvian tax if they are substitutes. Accordingly, our results regarding the dirt
tax seem to differ, somewhat, from the Bovenberg et al. results, even though the same
definition of the dirt tax is used. However, for reasons explained below, these differences in
results should not be exaggerated.
The explanation for the differences lies presumably in the objectives of the tax systems.
Bovenberg et al. abstract from distributional considerations by assuming identical individuals.
Thereby the goal of their tax systems is, in addition to correcting for the externality, to finance
public spending through distortionary taxation (the possibility of using lump-sum taxes is
assumed away). The dirt tax falls below the first-best Pigouvian tax because the tax system
focuses more on revenue-raising than externality-internalizing. This is reflected by a high
marginal cost of public funds, which incorporates the cost of distortionary taxation, in the
weighted average formula for the dirt tax. In our model redistribution is a main objective of
the tax system. This implies that a commodity tax will both supplement the income tax in
achieving the wanted distribution and correcting for the externality. Even though the dirt tax
                                                          
7 The double-dividend hypothesis claims that green taxes will both improve the environment and reduce the
existing distortions of the tax system. The first, environmental, dividend is not controversial. It is the second
dividend that provoke disagreement. There are, at least, two views regarding this second dividend in the double-
dividend literature. Schöb (1994) distinguishes these two views as the "environmental" and "public finance"
view. The environmental view claims that revenues from green taxes can be used to cut an ordinary, distortionary
tax and hence improve the efficiency of the rest of the tax system, while the public finance view argues that green
taxes exacerbate rather than alleviate preexisting distortions. The public finance view thereby focuses on the
effect of a green tax on the efficiency of the whole tax system. According to Schöb there is no real contradiction28
in our model fulfills the additive property, it is not a weighted average of a Ramsey and a
Pigouvian term. According to this, it is hard to make any direct comparisons between the
results of the two types of models.
Binding self-selection constraint, utility is weakly separable in externality
When utility is weakly separable in the externality and the self selection constraint binds, the





















































































(40) t t t z z
sp
z
p * = +







































It is not possible to determine the sign of tz
* unambiguously, except under very special
circumstances. These occur when there is a complementary relationship between the dirty
good and leisure and both the term l( ) V V E
im
E -
2  and expression (26) are positive. Under these
assumptions, tz
* becomes unambiguously positive. In all other situations we cannot tell
whether tz
* is positive or negative, i. e. if the dirty good is taxed or subsidized. However, it is
likely that tz
* will be lower than the Pigouvian tax, since the Pigouvian tax always is positive.
Thereby, it seems as if the results from the Bovenberg et al. studies becomes more likely when
we assume weak separability in the externality.
5. The Effective Marginal Tax
                                                                                                                                                                                    
between these two views. The differences in results appears because of differences in definitions and
normalizations.29
Edwards et al. define the total tax as the total tax payments the government can receive from
one person:
(41) t(y) = T(y) + tzz(pz, y - T(y), y)



















In their paper, Edwards et al. show that this effective marginal tax becomes zero for the high
ability individual and strictly positive for the low ability type. Thus, the Stiglitz' results holds
even in a non-linear optimal income tax model with commodity taxes, if both direct and
indirect taxes are accounted for. However, as Edwards et al. point out, this result implies that
the decisions of the highest earner cannot be entirely undistorted as in the Stiglitz' model. The
question raised in this paper is, what happens to the results regarding the effective marginal
tax rate in the presence of a consumption externality? We will answer this question under
weak separability and a non-binding self-selection constraint, and under additive separability
when the self-selection constraint binds.
The effective marginal tax rate when the self-selection constraint does not bind
When the self-selection constraint does not bind, we can derive an effective marginal tax for
both individual types, by substituting the MRS, equation (29) with l equal to zero, into


























From equation (43) it is evident that the effective marginal tax will be positive as long as the
dirty good is a substitute for leisure. When leisure and the dirty good are complements the30
effective marginal tax can be negative, zero or positive, depending on the size of ¶ ¶ z y
relative to ¶ ¶ z B  in absolute value. This result is remarkable since the marginal income tax is
zero and the commodity tax positive, for both individual types under these assumptions. The
explanation for this extraordinary result could be that, even though the Pigouvian tax is able to
fully internalize the externality and the non-linear income tax achieves the wanted
redistribution, this does not imply that the tax system is able to separate efficiency and equity
considerations.
Binding self-selection constraint, utility is additively separable in externality
When utility is additively separable in the externality, the effective marginal tax for the high










































According to equation (44), the marginal tax becomes positive whenever leisure and the dirty
good are substitutes. This is also the case when leisure and the dirty good are complements, if
the income effect is less than one but greater in absolute magnitude than the complementarity
effect, otherwise the effective marginal tax becomes negative. Consequently, the presumptions
about the sign of the income and substitution effects, influence the sign of the effective
marginal tax in the same way as they influenced the sign for the marginal income tax (when
the government did not have access to a commodity tax).






















































As for the high ability type, the results concerning the effective marginal tax are in line with
those for the marginal income tax (in the absence of a commodity tax). I. e. in short, the tax is
larger than in the no externality case when leisure and the dirty good are substitutes and
indeterminable when there is a complementary relationship between leisure and the dirty
good.
Accordingly, in spite of the externality, the results from the Edwards et al. paper, that in the
presence of commodity taxes the government will set the optimal tax structure so that the
effective marginal tax mirrors the marginal income tax (in the absence of commodity taxes)
still holds. This is also true for the case when utility is weakly separable in the externality, and
for which reason this case is not presented here.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored the interactions between a consumption externality and an optimal
non-linear income tax, with and without commodity taxation. We find that the consumption
externality clearly influences the marginal income tax when the government does not have
access to a commodity tax. In addition, the externality affects the marginal tax rates for the
two individual types, in our model, in the same directions, whereby we can conclude that, the
marginal tax not only has a redistributive purpose, but also a corrective aim under these
circumstances. The essence of our results is that the sign of the marginal income tax, in the
presence of an externality, becomes different from the Stiglitz "zero on the top, positive at the
bottom" result. Moreover, we find that this difference, compared to the conventional results,
will depend on the substitution/ complementary relationship between leisure and the dirty
good. This will be true whether we assume additive or weak separability regarding the
individual preferences over the externality, and whether or not the self-selection constraint
binds.
When the government can apply an indirect dirt tax, the marginal income tax becomes zero
for both individual types, if the incentive compatibility condition does not bind. Consequently,
the dirt tax becomes equal to the first-best Pigouvian tax. There is one surprising result in this
case though, the effective marginal tax, defined in Edwards et al., becomes different from32
zero. Thereby, we conclude that the tax system is not able to separate efficiency and equity
considerations even under these, very strict, assumptions.
When the self-selection constraint binds, the commodity (or dirt) tax will be different from the
first-best Pigouvian tax. The dirt tax will be higher than the first-best Pigouvian tax as long as
leisure and the dirty good are complements and utility is additively separable in the
externality, and lower than the Pigouvian tax if leisure and the dirty good are substitutes.
Accordingly, in this second case there might be a dirt subsidy instead of a dirt tax. If utiltity is
weakly separable in the externality we cannot tell, in general, whether the dirty good is taxed
or subsidized. However, this implies, that it becomes more likely that the dirt tax will be
lower than the Pigouvian tax, since the first-best Pigouvian tax always is positive.
The results regarding the dirt tax causes the marginal income tax to be positive when the dirt
tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax. However, the marginal income tax can be positive even if
the dirt tax is set at a higher level than the Pigouvian tax, if the income effect is sufficiently
small, otherwise the marginal income tax will be negative for the high ability individual an
indeterminable for the low ability one. The results regarding the marginal income tax in the
presence of a commodity tax will be the same whether utility is additively or weakly separable
in the externality.
Finally, we establish that the government will choose a tax structure where the effective
marginal tax mirrors the marginal income tax in the absence of commodity taxes. A result in
accordance with the results in Edwards et al.33
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The characterization of the solution to the government's optimizing problem:
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Appendix B
Transformation of the MRS for the low ability type when utility is additively separable in the
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which is inequality (23)
When utility is weakly separable in the externality equation (24) is transformed into inequality
(27) according to the same method. The transformation method is also applicable when there
is a commodity tax present in the model, i. e. the transformation of equation (30) into
inequality (32).
Appendix C
Derivation of effective marginal tax for high ability individuals:
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In order to arrive at an interpretable expression of the effective marginal tax rate for the low









































- + - +



















































































￿ = - + - + ( ) ( )
* *








































































1 1 1 ( ) ( )


















































































* * ( )


























































































































































￿ - equation (45)